Richard Giragosian

Armenia “talks Turkiye” in new diplomatic offensive

Not to say that the normalization process will be smooth, especially as Turkiye remains hostage to Azerbaijan in terms of options. Yet normalization between Armenia and Turkiye was never supposed to be that easy or that quick. And after all, look at how far the two sides have already come. This offers a degree of hope and optimism.

Türkiye sees opportunity from U.S. crisis

The danger for Türkiye here is the possible formation of a strategic alliance between the United States, Israel and Azerbaijan. Directed against Iran, such an alliance would not only isolate Iran, but would also check Russian regional ambitions. Most importantly, however, it would also sideline Türkiye. Although such a precarious alliance seems too difficult given the diverging interests of the potential partners, there has been several recent developments that tend to suggest that such a scenario, and such a sidelining of Türkiye, may be possible.

Türkiye-Azerbaijan: From Patron to Prisoner

In fact, it is precisely this issue of normalization with Armenia that has revealed just how much Azerbaijan holds the upper hand over Türkiye. The power of Azerbaijan’s influence and pressure over Türkiye’s options toward Armenia has now become a relationship of embarrassing weakness for Türkiye.

A Fresh Impetus for Armenia-Türkiye Normalization

During a meeting with the visiting Turkish journalists, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan provided a detailed overview of his government’s policies and perspectives regarding both relations with Türkiye as well as broader issues, including Armenia’s post-war negotiations with Azerbaijan. Second recent development that is even more significant as a driver for progress between Armenia and Türkiye. This notable development was the sudden announcement of a breakthrough agreement over the text of the draft bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fundamental weakness of this agreement rests with the absence of any international monitoring and no international guarantee. This only means that the risk lies with the “day after” any signing ceremony.

Turkey's Seismic Shift

The third seismic shift from the earthquake is rooted in a more localized, but direct impact on Armenia-Turkey “normalization.” In what is now a breakthrough in normalization between Armenia and Turkey, the re-opening of the border is the most obvious validation of “earthquake diplomacy.”

18 February 2023

“Armenia at Antalya”

Although much of the Antalya event was focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Armenian foreign minister was a sought-after guest, with great media interest. The Armenian participation was significant for two main reasons.

The Deeper Significance of Armenia’s Early Election

Yet it is now clear that for Pashinyan, forcing the former corrupt authoritarian regime from power was far easier than actually governing the country. But this election was very much a stark choice between the past and the future.

The Year 2020: The Three Wars of the South Caucasus

As in the earlier wars of both April 2016 and September-October 2020, Armenia is dangerously under-equipped and ill-prepared. Any chance to seize diplomatic opportunities to salvage what remains of Karabakh may be lost, as neither Armenia nor Karabakh have a diplomatic strategy. And there is a related absence of any “end state” objective for Karabakh.

16 December 2020

Turkey in the Post-War Caucasus

But after the end of the war for Karabakh, there are many questions over what comes next, with no clear answers and even fewer certainties.

17 November 2020

Nagorno-Karabakh: The growing rick of 'war by accident'

11 September 2017

Armenia's delicate security balance

16 December 2016

Turkey-Russia: The Challenge of Inherent Rivalry

7 December 2016

Assesing Armenia's new prime minister

11 September 2016

Instability and Uncertainity in Armenia

The aftermath of the failed coup: Implications for Turkish foreign policy