A Fresh Impetus for Armenia-Türkiye Normalization
During a meeting with the visiting Turkish journalists, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan provided a detailed overview of his government’s policies and perspectives regarding both relations with Türkiye as well as broader issues, including Armenia’s post-war negotiations with Azerbaijan.
Second recent development that is even more significant as a driver for progress between Armenia and Türkiye. This notable development was the sudden announcement of a breakthrough agreement over the text of the draft bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The fundamental weakness of this agreement rests with the absence of any international monitoring and no international guarantee. This only means that the risk lies with the “day after” any signing ceremony.
The complicated course of Armenia-Türkiye “normalization” has never been easy and has always been a process of progress and setback. But two recent developments have provided a fresh sense of optimism and a real impetus for success in the normalization process. Although the timing of these two recent developments was more of a coincidence, they are related and each is significant.
The first of these two developments was the Armenian government’s invitation and hosting of a group of prominent journalists and media professionals from Türkiye. The visit was organized by the Armenian side as part of a broader attempt to shape and improve the image of Armenia in the Turkish media.
During a meeting with the visiting Turkish journalists, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan provided a detailed overview of his government’s policies and perspectives regarding both relations with Türkiye as well as broader issues, including Armenia’s post-war negotiations with Azerbaijan. During this long meeting, the Armenian Prime Minister offered candid and, at times, controversial comments, especially related to his view and position regarding the Armenian genocide issue.
Armenian Premier Challenges Genocide Narrative
More specifically, Pashinyan stressed that “our official position is that international recognition of the Armenian genocide is not among our foreign policy priorities today,” adding that the genocide issue has long been absent from the talks with Türkiye. He went on to challenge the impact from the campaign for genocide recognition in other countries, adding that “when even very distant countries make such decisions……the next question arises: what do those decisions give us in our relations with our immediate neighborhood?”
Beyond the direct nature of these comments, Pashinyan’s position is not new. Rather, it reflects his earlier statements, such as in January 2025, when he argued that Armenians should “understand what happened” in 1915 and grasp the motivation behind international genocide recognition efforts.
Yet even these recent remarks failed to spark any significant domestic outrage or reaction. The negative reception to his words were largely centered among a group of Armenian historians and political opposition groups, but did not trigger any serious public response.
Breakthrough Agreement on Armenia-Azerbaijan “Peace Treaty”
But it was the second recent development that is even more significant as a driver for progress between Armenia and Türkiye. This notable development was the sudden announcement of a breakthrough agreement over the text of the draft bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Actually, the rather sudden announcement of an agreement over a bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is less surprising than it seems. In fact, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides have been engaged in delicate and difficult negotiations over this agreement for some time. And after two expected deadlines passed with no progress, this recent breakthrough came about after a final settlement of two unresolved portions of the text.
Moreover, this agreement is significant as a genuine breakthrough, for two reasons. First, it is a welcome validation of diplomacy over force of arms and can be seen as a move by the Azerbaijani side to de-escalate and climb down from their previous discourse of threats against Armenia.
And a second reason that this agreement is an important breakthrough is that it follows a recent resumption of separate talks over border demarcation, an equally challenging issue for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Yet this agreement has less to do with the Nagorno Karabakh issue, especially as Azerbaijan succeeded in retaking Karabakh after its forced expulsion of the Armenian population, at gunpoint, back in September 2023.
At the same time, the fundamental weakness of this agreement rests with the absence of any international monitoring and no international guarantee. This only means that the risk lies with the “day after” any signing ceremony. Although little is known regarding the details of the new agreement, as both the text and the talks have been conducted in closed and secret settings, the general document reportedly sets forth a “normalization” of relations between the countries, based on a mutual dismissal of territorial claims.
What is noteworthy, however, is what is missing from the agreement. More specifically, the lack of any real or resolute reference to Nagorno Karabakh is indicative of the current reality of Armenia’s loss and weakness. Rather, the Armenian concession to abandon international legal claims and challenges regarding Karabakh only suggest a further weakening of the Karabakh issue, and the virtual validation of Azerbaijan’s military victory in retaking Karabakh by force.
What Next for Armenia- Türkiye?
As important as this agreement is or may become, it is equally clear that the real test lies with the implantation of the terms of the peace treaty. The key questions that remain unanswered are whether this peace treaty will be enough of a victory for Azerbaijan, or will the threats to Armenia from Azerbaijan continue? And with the delicate issues of border demarcation and the restoration of road and rail links each unresolved, the next challenge may likely focus on Azerbaijan’s maximalist demands over those issues. Nevertheless, even with real expectations for possible continued tension to continue, this agreement may very well mark a turning point of progress in the post-war South Caucasus.
The agreement also provides Ankara with a new opportunity to fulfill its own “normalization” with Yerevan. This progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not only the “political cover” sought by the Erdogan government to move forward, but it also removes any justification for Ankara to continue to keep the border with Armenia closed and to deny diplomatic relations with Yerevan.
(Richard Giragosian is the Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent “think tank” in Yerevan, Armenia)
The first of these two developments was the Armenian government’s invitation and hosting of a group of prominent journalists and media professionals from Türkiye. The visit was organized by the Armenian side as part of a broader attempt to shape and improve the image of Armenia in the Turkish media.
During a meeting with the visiting Turkish journalists, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan provided a detailed overview of his government’s policies and perspectives regarding both relations with Türkiye as well as broader issues, including Armenia’s post-war negotiations with Azerbaijan. During this long meeting, the Armenian Prime Minister offered candid and, at times, controversial comments, especially related to his view and position regarding the Armenian genocide issue.
Armenian Premier Challenges Genocide Narrative
More specifically, Pashinyan stressed that “our official position is that international recognition of the Armenian genocide is not among our foreign policy priorities today,” adding that the genocide issue has long been absent from the talks with Türkiye. He went on to challenge the impact from the campaign for genocide recognition in other countries, adding that “when even very distant countries make such decisions……the next question arises: what do those decisions give us in our relations with our immediate neighborhood?”
Beyond the direct nature of these comments, Pashinyan’s position is not new. Rather, it reflects his earlier statements, such as in January 2025, when he argued that Armenians should “understand what happened” in 1915 and grasp the motivation behind international genocide recognition efforts.
Yet even these recent remarks failed to spark any significant domestic outrage or reaction. The negative reception to his words were largely centered among a group of Armenian historians and political opposition groups, but did not trigger any serious public response.
Breakthrough Agreement on Armenia-Azerbaijan “Peace Treaty”
But it was the second recent development that is even more significant as a driver for progress between Armenia and Türkiye. This notable development was the sudden announcement of a breakthrough agreement over the text of the draft bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Actually, the rather sudden announcement of an agreement over a bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is less surprising than it seems. In fact, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides have been engaged in delicate and difficult negotiations over this agreement for some time. And after two expected deadlines passed with no progress, this recent breakthrough came about after a final settlement of two unresolved portions of the text.
Moreover, this agreement is significant as a genuine breakthrough, for two reasons. First, it is a welcome validation of diplomacy over force of arms and can be seen as a move by the Azerbaijani side to de-escalate and climb down from their previous discourse of threats against Armenia.
And a second reason that this agreement is an important breakthrough is that it follows a recent resumption of separate talks over border demarcation, an equally challenging issue for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Yet this agreement has less to do with the Nagorno Karabakh issue, especially as Azerbaijan succeeded in retaking Karabakh after its forced expulsion of the Armenian population, at gunpoint, back in September 2023.
At the same time, the fundamental weakness of this agreement rests with the absence of any international monitoring and no international guarantee. This only means that the risk lies with the “day after” any signing ceremony. Although little is known regarding the details of the new agreement, as both the text and the talks have been conducted in closed and secret settings, the general document reportedly sets forth a “normalization” of relations between the countries, based on a mutual dismissal of territorial claims.
What is noteworthy, however, is what is missing from the agreement. More specifically, the lack of any real or resolute reference to Nagorno Karabakh is indicative of the current reality of Armenia’s loss and weakness. Rather, the Armenian concession to abandon international legal claims and challenges regarding Karabakh only suggest a further weakening of the Karabakh issue, and the virtual validation of Azerbaijan’s military victory in retaking Karabakh by force.
What Next for Armenia- Türkiye?
As important as this agreement is or may become, it is equally clear that the real test lies with the implantation of the terms of the peace treaty. The key questions that remain unanswered are whether this peace treaty will be enough of a victory for Azerbaijan, or will the threats to Armenia from Azerbaijan continue? And with the delicate issues of border demarcation and the restoration of road and rail links each unresolved, the next challenge may likely focus on Azerbaijan’s maximalist demands over those issues. Nevertheless, even with real expectations for possible continued tension to continue, this agreement may very well mark a turning point of progress in the post-war South Caucasus.
The agreement also provides Ankara with a new opportunity to fulfill its own “normalization” with Yerevan. This progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not only the “political cover” sought by the Erdogan government to move forward, but it also removes any justification for Ankara to continue to keep the border with Armenia closed and to deny diplomatic relations with Yerevan.
(Richard Giragosian is the Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent “think tank” in Yerevan, Armenia)
