A fragile state of peace continues in the neighboring country. Relations between the Kurdish element and the Arab element, which has its roots in political Islam and is seeking either to seize control of the country or simply to retain its hold on it, are proceeding with ups and downs. For example, in addition to earlier military and administrative appointments, Ilham Ahmed, Rojava’s de facto head of foreign relations, has been appointed a member of the interim assembly, while commander Mazlum Abdi has been appointed an adviser to interim President Sharaa.
Although the parties aim to achieve integration through non-confrontational means, Damascus’ impositions and Qamishli’s demands have proved difficult to reconcile. The issues revolve around three fundamental matters: security-defense, education, and the Kurds having some form of say in the areas where they constitute the majority of the population.
I have discussed education at considerable length in previous assessments. Damascus’ directive of “instruction in Arabic, with Kurdish taught as an elective subject and for a limited number of hours” remains in force. However, the Kurdish side, and students in particular, continue to defy it. They are not attending classes, and the system is gradually moving towards a parallel Kurdish-language education system. On the other hand, after more than a decade in which students have received Kurdish-language education from kindergarten through university, Damascus lacks the teachers, curriculum and financial resources to transfer them to Arabic-language instruction, even by force. All it does is keep issuing circulars.
The second issue is the security of the population. The former Asayish, the police force from the Rojava period, remains in place. Indeed, it is known that some of the heavy weapons left by the US military as it withdrew have been retained locally. After all, theoretically, against whom could these weapons be used other than in the defense of Syria? Even the chronically anti-Kurdish, undisciplined Salafi gangs are unwilling to fight.
In this context, negotiations had been under way for months over the possibility of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), which Damascus has insisted could “under no circumstances” join the army, serving instead as an anti-terrorism unit. Recently, Mazlum Abdi stated that Damascus approved the YPJ’s role as two special counterterrorism forces in the Jazira and Kobani regions. YPJ spokesperson Rukşen Mohamed, meanwhile, said that the Interior Ministry agreed to integrate two special battalions, each consisting of 400 YPJ fighters. She added that the remaining YPJ members will join other units of the Interior Ministry. She also stated that files containing the details of 1,484 personnel in total had been submitted to the authorities, but that no response has yet been received.
At the beginning of the year, when the integration of the YPJ into state institutions was being discussed, the figure being mentioned was approximately 2,500 women fighters. At present, however, it is reported that nearly 1,000 women fighters have joined Asayish, the local security force.
Despite these developments, it remains unclear how any of these arrangements will actually be implemented.
Nevertheless, the key point to emphasize on security is that the former Rojava administration has retained its weapons while negotiations have been taking place.
As for the Kurds having a say in the areas where they live, it is obvious that their gradual return to places such as Afrin and Serekaniye, where they once lived in large numbers, would facilitate their representation. Moreover, it is reported that Ankara is withdrawing, both militarily and in civilian terms, from the areas it has kept under its control. News reports also indicate that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have deployed along the border, although the border crossings have not yet reopened.
As with the other two issues, representation and a degree of autonomy are far from matters that Damascus can readily stomach. Following Abdi’s statement to NuçeTV on November 9 that a special force was being trained for Afrin and would begin operating soon, the disagreement with Damascus intensified.
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Although Ankara is currently the external power most frequently mentioned when discussing the future of the Syrian Kurds, or indeed of Syria as a whole, it is not Syria’s only foreign connection.
Three examples:
Israel dominates southern Syria and exerts influence over Damascus through the United States.
Under pressure from Riyadh, the administration, which is incapable of building a proper army, appears to have decided to send 5,000 of the foreign jihadists who fought during the civil war, and whom it has no idea what to do with, to the Yemeni front.
During Macron’s visit in July, comprehensive cooperation agreements were signed covering energy infrastructure and offshore fossil fuel exploration; maritime transport; airports and air transport; the rehabilitation of water networks; the development of the Central Bank’s institutional capacity; the modernization of hospitals and infrastructure of all kinds; and the introduction of French as an elective subject in the education system.
Other countries interested in Syria include the UAE, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Germany and China. What distinguishes all of them from Ankara, which is assumed to exercise control over Syria, is that they also provide financing for the joint projects they develop. Damascus, like Ankara, has no money.
This final point is important. The economic stranglehold in which the entire Syrian population finds itself is a ticking time bomb, ready to explode. Let us make a note of that!


