As Armenia approaches its June 7, 2026 parliamentary election, the agenda on the surface appears to be an electoral contest. But the real story is not in the vote shares; it lies in the balancing act the country has been trying to maintain simultaneously on four different fronts over the past three months. The question is no longer simply “Russia or Europe?” It has become much more difficult: how the election winner will protect the country’s security, economy, and sovereignty at the same time.
In previous weeks, I analyzed the poll results that had entered the public domain in detail and evaluated them from various perspectives. At the time of writing, based on the latest available data (at least for now), the least surprising aspect appears to be the polling results. The February and May 2026 surveys conducted by International Republican Institute (IRI), along with Armenian Election Study’s (ArmES) three-wave measurements, all point in the same direction.
Accordingly, support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party has risen by 8 points to 32%; the share of people who believe the country is moving in the right direction has increased from 47% to 61%; and satisfaction with the prime minister has jumped from 46% to 62%. What we are seeing is a gradual, systemic shift that has now been confirmed by two independent sources.Nevertheless, two major questions remain unresolved: the 44% “silent mass,” whose indecision has decreased but whose reluctance to express opinions has increased, and the TRIPP project, which has almost perfectly divided the electorate in half.
The polls show a structural advantage for the government. Yet, there are also some risks for the government. So why are voters moving toward the government despite pressure on so many fronts? The answer may lie precisely in how these pressures shape voters’ perception of risk. Let us examine these four fronts one by one.
Relations with Russia
The first—and perhaps the most important—front is relations with Russia. According to survey data collected by early May, the share of respondents who considered Russia Armenia’s most important partner fell from 43% to 35%, while those viewing Russia as a threat rose from 29% to 32%. Support for an exclusively pro-Russian orientation declined from 33% to 27%.
On May 29, the members of the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan), meeting in Astana, called on Armenia to hold a referendum “as soon as possible” on whether it preferred the European Union or the EAEU. Prime Minister Pashinyan had already skipped the summit, citing the election and campaign period. Moscow later imposed restrictions on various Armenian exports, including fruit, vegetables, and fish, and recalled its ambassador from Yerevan. Several senior Russian officials, including Putin, drew comparisons to a “Ukrainian scenario.” Although this situation might seem to strengthen the hand of the pro-Russian opposition during the election campaign, the gradual decline in support for Strong Armenia (from 9% to 6%) suggests that voters are not reacting to the Russian card as expected. Moscow’s pressure may be triggering national reflexes rather than fear.
The Cost of Leaving the EAEU
This balancing act between the EU and the EAEU is difficult for Armenia.The EAEU provides Armenia with access to the Russian market, inexpensive energy, and the free movement of labor. Remittances sent home by hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens working in Russia constitute an important source of income for families in Armenia. A significant portion of Armenia’s agricultural exports also depends on the Russian market. Leaving the EAEU would mean work-permit requirements, risks to money transfers, and a lengthy process of redirecting exports toward European markets. Putin compared the issue to a marriage, effectively saying: “If you want a divorce, say so openly and demonstrate that the people support that decision.” Pashinyan and nearly all senior government officials have responded as softly as possible to such comments. They reject the marriage analogy and insist that Armenia maintains “very good relations” with Russia. They state that all relevant details have been discussed openly and honestly with their Russian counterparts and characterize existing problems as merely “technical.”
Putin’s marriage analogy is not entirely wrong, but it is incomplete. It resembles a relationship that has become toxic, in which one partner continually subjects the other to psychological pressure. The weaker party may wish to leave but lacks the economic independence necessary to do so. At this point, the EU could function as a kind of shelter, helping the abused partner. If that support materializes, the separation could occur far more quickly than expected.
Relations with the West
The second front concerns relations with the West—the EU and the United States. In May 2026, Yerevan hosted both the 8th European Political Community Summit and the first-ever EU-Armenia Summit. The EU pledged to deepen security and defense cooperation and announced €30 million in support through the European Peace Facility. Armenia also signed strategic partnership agreements with the United Kingdom, France, Croatia, and Bulgaria. On the U.S. side, statements by Trump were widely interpreted as expressing support for Pashinyan.The effects of this orientation are visible in polling data. Support for EU membership has reached 75%. In the ranking of Armenia’s “most important partner,” France surged from 27% to 39% and moved into first place. Meanwhile, the United States fell from 42% to 27%. This shift from the U.S. toward the EU may be linked to the timing of the surveys, which coincided with the summits held on May 4–5.
Border Tied to Another Country’s Calendar
The third front involves relations with Turkey. Developments on this front appear to be moving at two different speeds. At the state level, cautious diplomatic steps are being taken. Turkish Airlines has maintained scheduled Istanbul–Yerevan flights since March. On May 13, Turkey approved simplified customs procedures for the movement of goods through third countries. During the European Political Community Summit, an agreement was signed regarding the restoration of the historic Ani Bridge. The Kars Chamber of Commerce publicly called for the border to be opened, and a Turkey-Armenia Business Forum subsequently took place. In other words, people-to-people diplomacy is running ahead of state diplomacy. Yet the border remains closed. Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Ankara stated the conditions under which the border could be opened—a statement that drew criticism from some former Turkish ambassadors. Azerbaijan is demanding the removal of references in Armenia’s constitution that it interprets as claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, specifically references connected to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, and insists that these changes be approved by referendum. As a result, the Turkish border is effectively tied to a political timetable determined in another capital. And for now, the key to that lock appears to be missing.
Support for TRIPP, But…
The fourth and most complicated front concerns the signing of a permanent peace agreement with Azerbaijan. A draft agreement prepared in Washington was initialed on August 8, 2025, but has not yet been formally signed. The constitutional issue mentioned above, as well as disagreements over how the route connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan should operate, remain the primary obstacles. Yerevan believes that the route issue has been resolved through its sovereignty-based “Crossroads of Peace” framework and through the U.S. promotion of the package under the TRIPP brand. However, the latest polling data show that society is almost perfectly divided on this issue. Support for the TRIPP project stands at 44%, while opposition is at 41%. The text of peace treaty may be ready, but the democratic consensus needed to sustain the signature afterward is not.
When all these fronts are considered together, the picture becomes clear: Armenia is trying to stop being an “all-or-nothing” country and become a “both-and” country. It seeks to avoid tying its security to a single actor, transform itself from a country of closed borders into a transit and connectivity hub, move beyond post-Soviet reflexes toward a more institutionalized state mindset, and accomplish all three goals simultaneously. If it succeeds, geography becomes an opportunity. If it fails, geography becomes a source of pressure that necessitates walking a thin line that demands extraordinary balance.
The vote cast on June 7 is ultimately a vote on this vision. The polls show Pashinyan holding a structural advantage, but that advantage stems less from enthusiastic support than from the perception that the opposition represents a greater risk. As noted before, the question “Who can govern better?” is gradually being replaced by “Which risk is more manageable?” The decisive factor will be how many members of the silent majority—those willing to tolerate and navigate this nearly impossible four-sided balancing act—actually turn out to vote.
