Richard Giragosian

The third seismic shift from the earthquake is rooted in a more localized, but direct impact on Armenia-Turkey “normalization.” In what is now a breakthrough in normalization between Armenia and Turkey, the re-opening of the border is the most obvious validation of “earthquake diplomacy.”

Although much of the Antalya event was focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Armenian foreign minister was a sought-after guest, with great media interest. The Armenian participation was significant for two main reasons.

Yet it is now clear that for Pashinyan, forcing the former corrupt authoritarian regime from power was far easier than actually governing the country. But this election was very much a stark choice between the past and the future.

As in the earlier wars of both April 2016 and September-October 2020, Armenia is dangerously under-equipped and ill-prepared. Any chance to seize diplomatic opportunities to salvage what remains of Karabakh may be lost, as neither Armenia nor Karabakh have a diplomatic strategy. And there is a related absence of any “end state” objective for Karabakh.

But after the end of the war for Karabakh, there are many questions over what comes next, with no clear answers and even fewer certainties.